CN-121982808-A - Traceable self-counting ballot Condorcet voting system based on blockchain

CN121982808ACN 121982808 ACN121982808 ACN 121982808ACN-121982808-A

Abstract

The invention discloses a block chain-based traceable self-counting vote Condorcet voting system which comprises an election organizer, a block chain network module, an intelligent contract cluster, a plurality of election terminal modules and a homomorphic time lock calculation module. The invention constructs a set of block chain-based decentralization Condorcet voting framework, can realize vote submission, vote structure verification and automatic vote counting under the condition of no trusted third party, and remarkably improves the credibility and transparency of the voting system.

Inventors

LEI HONG
SUN YIQI
LIU ZIXUAN

Assignees

海南大学

Dates

Publication Date: 20260505
Application Date: 20251217

Claims (10)

1. The traceable self-counting vote Condorcet voting system based on the blockchain is characterized by comprising an election organizer, a blockchain network module, an intelligent contract cluster, a plurality of election terminal modules and a homomorphic time lock calculation module; the election organizer is responsible for initiating an election event, setting a candidate list, generating system public parameters and deploying a blockchain intelligent contract; The block chain network module is used for storing system public parameters, a citizen registration list, verified encrypted ballot data and aggregated homomorphic ciphertext and providing distributed account book service; the intelligent contract cluster comprises a registration management contract, a voting verification contract and a counting contract, and the functions of citizen registration management, ballot verification and homomorphic aggregation counting are respectively executed; The selecting terminal module is used for generating a selecting public and private key pair, constructing Condorcet pair comparison matrixes, executing homomorphic time lock puzzle encryption and non-interactive zero knowledge proof generation, and constructing a traceable ring signature; the homomorphic time lock calculation module is used for executing time lock delay decryption of the aggregation ciphertext after the voting is stopped, recovering the global paired comparison matrix and calculating Condorcet winners.
2. The system of claim 1, wherein the blockchain network module includes a plurality of consensus nodes, and the stored system common parameters include bilinear swarm pairs Generating element Generating element A strong RSA modulus N, a time parameter t, a tracking key pair (EPK, ESK), a candidate set C, and an event identification event, wherein, In the form of a bilinear cluster pair, For a bilinear mapping, , 。
3. The system of claim 2, wherein among contracts of the intelligent contract cluster, a registration management contract is used for maintaining a registration list of votes, a vote validation contract is used for verifying non-interactive zero knowledge proof and traceable ring signatures, and a vote counting contract is used for executing homomorphic aggregation and vote counting related logic.
4. A system according to claim 3, wherein the election terminal module comprises: A key generation unit for generating a private key pair (x k ,y k ) of the selected public; The ballot construction unit is used for selecting the ballots according to the citizens Preference generation n x n pair-wise comparison matrix If the candidate is Is superior to the sorting of the people Then On the contrary I and j are candidate numbers, n is the number of candidates, and k is the number of candidates; encryption unit for encrypting matrix element by homomorphic time puzzle to generate encryption comparison matrix ; And the signature unit is used for constructing a traceable ring signature based on the registration list of the selector and carrying out anonymous signature on the encrypted ballot and the validity proof.
5. The system of claim 4, wherein the homomorphic time lock computing module comprises a non-interactive zero knowledge proof generating unit, a homomorphic aggregation unit, and a time lock puzzle unit; The non-interactive zero knowledge proof generating unit is used for constructing a non-interactive zero knowledge proof set containing diagonal legal proofs, boolean legal proofs, antisymmetric constraint proofs and row and displacement constraint proofs; The homomorphic aggregation unit is used for executing product operation on corresponding elements of all legal encryption matrixes through counting contracts to realize homomorphic mapping of plaintext summation; the time-locked puzzle unit is used for generating HTLP instances meeting the addition homomorphism.
6. The system of claim 5, wherein in the non-interactive zero knowledge proof set, each proof functions as follows: Diagonal validation proof that the pair comparison matrix main diagonal elements satisfy the following for any candidate with the number i ; Boolean validation proof of each comparison value Only 0 or 1 can be taken without exposing a specific value; antisymmetric constraint proves that any candidate pair (i, j) must satisfy ; Line and permutation constraint proof, proving that line sums of lines are compared in pairs Must form a candidate set I.e. all rows and each other are different.
7. The system of claim 6, wherein the encryption unit encrypts the matrix elements using a homomorphic time-lock puzzle to generate an encryption comparison matrix For each candidate The unit performs the following steps: Step one, random number selection Random selection of selection people The method comprises the steps of randomizing ciphertext; HTLP puzzle component structure Recording device Is that Is used to calculate the intermediate variable T, For any one of And (3) constructing: is the first part of the ciphertext that contains the encryption key; Encapsulating homomorphic ciphertext part of the data for the second part of the ciphertext, wherein the homomorphic ciphertext part carries homomorphic encrypted plaintext information, and encrypting the vote by using an encryption key; When (when) Time, order 、 At this time there is ; Multiplication group being modulo N A subgroup of elements of Jacobi notation 1; step three, combined puzzle structure For the following The encryption result of the element is expressed in a form of a binary group: The above construction is performed on all elements in the matrix by the selector to form a complete encryption comparison matrix: 。
8. The system of claim 7, wherein the homomorphic time lock computing module comprises a ciphertext receiving unit, a distributed decrypting unit, a Condorcet winner computing unit, a result submitting unit; The ciphertext receiving unit reads an aggregate ciphertext formed by combining all legal player encryption votes, a strong RSA modulus N and a time parameter t from the blockchain; the distributed decryption unit divides the operation task into a plurality of subtasks, distributes the subtasks to a plurality of participating nodes and recovers the plaintext , Representing all pairs of people " Whether or not to be better than In this "comparison relationship of the present invention, Winning total ticket number, m is total number of the selected people; Winner calculation unit when all After being decrypted, a global pair comparison matrix is formed: matrix Elements of (a) It is shown that among the set of all the selection people, If there is a candidate with the number w according to Condorcet rule The method meets the following conditions: Then Is the overall Condorcet winner; And the result submitting unit writes the global paired comparison matrix T and Condorcet winners into the blockchain and generates result verification certificates.
9. The system of claim 1, further comprising a repeated vote tracking module to detect repeated signatures within the same event domain, recover repeated vote election public keys via a traceable ring signature resolution mechanism, the intelligent contract cluster further comprising a tracking contract to trigger a tracking computation upon detection of repeated votes.
10. The system of claim 9, wherein the functional unit of the repeat vote tracking module comprises: the signature storage unit is used for storing traceable ring signatures of all legal votes in the same event domain and corresponding hash values; the repeated detection unit is used for identifying repeated signatures under the same event identifier by comparing the signature hash value with the signature label; the public key recovery unit is used for calling a corresponding algorithm when the repeated signature and the tracking key pair are input, and recovering the public key of repeated voting citizens; and the evidence generation unit is used for generating tracking evidence comprising repeated signature, submitting time stamp and recovering public key, and writing the evidence into the blockchain for audit tracing.

Description

Traceable self-counting ballot Condorcet voting system based on blockchain Technical Field The invention relates to the technical field of electronic voting and information security, in particular to a block chain-based traceable self-counting ballot Condorcet voting system. Background With the development of internet technology, distributed systems and digital governance, electronic voting is becoming an important way for various organizations, communities and online platforms to make decisions. The electronic voting system not only requires the realization of a convenient voting process, but also ensures the privacy, correctness, verifiability and manipulation resistance of the votes. Among a plurality of voting rules, condorcet sorting voting can reflect the overall preference of the voter and has stronger social selection characteristics, and is considered as a decision mode with higher fairness and stable election result. However, existing electronic implementations for Condorcet votes still present a number of challenges. Conventional electronic voting systems generally rely on a centralized ballot server or trusted third party authority to manage votes, statistics, or perform ballot authentication. The centralized mode brings obvious trust risks that on one hand, a centralized server can be attacked, down or maliciously manipulated, and on the other hand, the credibility of a third party mechanism is difficult to ensure completely, and once intentional tampering, internal leakage or forced cooperation manipulation behaviors occur, the safety and fairness of the voting system are directly affected. Therefore, the realization of correctness and privacy protection of the voting system on the premise of no trusted third party has become an important direction of electronic voting research. At the same time, electronic voting systems need to meet stringent privacy protection requirements. The selection's preferences belong to highly sensitive information and in Condorcet order votes, the selection needs to submit a list of preferences for all candidates, the amount of information being much higher than for simple endorsement/anti-endorsement votes or scoring votes. Once a vote is revealed or an analyst is associated with a particular identity, the privacy of the selection may be severely violated, possibly even leading to threat, duress or population pressure problems. Therefore, how to effectively hide the sorting structure of the voters while guaranteeing the validity of the votes is a key technical difficulty in the process of digitizing the votes Condorcet. In the absence of trusted party ticketing, self-ticketing (Self-Tallying) becomes a research hotspot. The self-counting mechanism requires that all votes are issued to a public ledger or a shared storage area in a specific encryption mode, and any person can independently verify and calculate a final result after meeting certain conditions. The self-counting mechanism does not depend on a third party mechanism, but also faces new challenges of ensuring that ciphertext submitted by voters meets Condorcet sorting format requirements, verifying the validity of the votes without revealing the plaintext of the votes, avoiding that malicious voters destroy the counting process by using illegal ciphertext, and ensuring that the votes can be correctly decrypted or opened and successfully completed in the voting revealing stage. In addition, the electronic voting system must also solve the double voting (Double Voting) problem. In traditional centralized voting, the server can avoid repeated voting of the same identity by maintaining a voting record, whereas in a decentralised system, identity authentication and repeatability detection become more complex. Particularly, when the anonymity of the selection is protected, balance needs to be achieved between the two, namely the true identity of the selection cannot be exposed, and each selection must be ensured to vote only once. In the prior art, ring Signature (Ring Signature) provides a voting mode with stronger anonymity, but is difficult to effectively track double votes, while traceable Ring Signature (Traceable Ring Signature) can detect repeated submission while keeping anonymity, but still needs to be combined with voting rules to design a constraint mechanism suitable for Condorcet ordering structure. On the other hand, the traditional electronic voting system mainly relies on interactive zero-knowledge proof in the aspect of voting content inspection, but the interactive protocol needs multiple rounds of communication and is not suitable for a large-scale network environment. To reduce communication overhead and enhance system deployability, non-interactive zero-Knowledge proof (NIZK) is a key technology for implementing vote validity verification. However, condorcet sorting votes is complex in structure, and it is difficult to efficiently verify whether the sorting format is correct using only conv