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CN-122001573-A - Security key distribution system, method and chip based on physical random entropy source

CN122001573ACN 122001573 ACN122001573 ACN 122001573ACN-122001573-A

Abstract

The invention discloses a secure key distribution system, a secure key distribution method and a secure key distribution chip based on a physical random source, wherein the secure key distribution system takes a highly-trusted physical random source as a trust root, entropy materials are safely pre-distributed to a terminal special chip through a trusted filling station network to form a local entropy pool with hardware binding, when in communication, both parties can synchronously extract the same entropy segments from the respective entropy pools based on disposable seeds and a preset synchronization algorithm without interaction so as to generate a session key, the system supports online updating of the local entropy pools through quantum key distribution, and the system constructs a complete trust transfer chain from a physical world to a digital world, thereby solving the fundamental problem of key initialization and distribution of a large-scale cryptographic system and having high security and high deployment efficiency.

Inventors

  • TONG YINGWEI

Assignees

  • 安徽云玺量子科技有限公司
  • 童迎伟

Dates

Publication Date
20260508
Application Date
20260210

Claims (11)

  1. 1. A secure key distribution system based on a physical random entropy source, comprising: a root physical entropy source for generating and providing a main entropy pool; At least one trusted filling station configured to obtain entropy material from the main entropy pool and to securely fill it to a terminal device; the system comprises a plurality of terminal devices, a plurality of secure charging stations and a plurality of secure charging stations, wherein a special secure chip is arranged in each terminal device, and a local entropy pool which is injected by the trusted charging stations and is bound with the trusted charging stations is stored in a secure memory of the chip; The control center is used for managing the identity of the terminal and the communication strategy; Wherein the two communicating terminal devices are configured to extract identical entropy data segments from the respective local entropy pools by performing identical deterministic synchronization functions based on a shared synchronization seed and to generate identical session keys accordingly.
  2. 2. The system of claim 1, wherein the trusted filling station is a plurality of sites deployed in a distributed manner.
  3. 3. The system of claim 1, wherein the local entropy pool is cryptographically bound to hardware unique identity information of the dedicated security chip.
  4. 4. The system of claim 1, further comprising a quantum key distribution network, wherein the control center is configured to obtain a quantum key from the quantum key distribution network and instruct a target terminal device to receive the quantum key and to incorporate it as a new portion into the local entropy pool after chip identity binding.
  5. 5. The system of claim 1, wherein the private security chip comprises a physical security domain and a general purpose computing domain isolated by hardware, and wherein execution of the deterministic synchronization function and access operations to the local entropy pool are restricted to be performed within the physical security domain.
  6. 6. The system of claim 5, wherein the physical security domain and the general purpose computing domain are connected by a unidirectional isolation interface configured to allow data to flow only from the physical security domain to the general purpose computing domain.
  7. 7. The system according to any of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that the synchronization seed is securely transmitted by means of a key derived from a local entropy pool preset by both parties of the communication.
  8. 8. A key distribution method based on the system of any one of claims 1 to 7, comprising the steps of: The first terminal generates a synchronous seed; After the first terminal obtains the authorization, the synchronous seed is sent to a second terminal safely; The first terminal and the second terminal respectively calculate by using the same synchronization function according to the synchronization seeds to obtain the same entropy segment locator; the first terminal and the second terminal read the same target entropy data segment from the respective pre-stored local entropy pools according to the locator; And the first terminal and the second terminal derive the same session key based on the target entropy section.
  9. 9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that the calculation of the synchronization function depends on a master synchronization key preset in the security chip dedicated to both terminals and bound to the respective local entropy pool.
  10. 10. A dedicated security chip for use in the system of any one of claims 1 to 7, said chip being integrated in a single silicon base, comprising: A physical security domain, in which a hardware identity module, a true random number generator, a secure memory, a secure injection interface, and a synchronization engine are integrated; a general computing domain, in which a cryptographic coprocessor is integrated; a unidirectional quarantine interface connects the physical security domain with a general purpose computing domain and is configured to prevent the general purpose computing domain from accessing keying material in the physical security domain.
  11. 11. The special security chip of claim 10, wherein the security injection interface is configured to call the hardware identity module for real-time encryption binding processing on any key material input from outside and then store the key material in the security memory.

Description

Security key distribution system, method and chip based on physical random entropy source Technical Field The invention relates to the fields of cryptography and information security, in particular to a secure key distribution system, a secure key distribution method and a secure key distribution chip based on a physical random entropy source. Background Currently, the main technical paths against quantum computing threats include Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). While QKD provides information theory security, its deployment relies heavily on dedicated fiber links, the terminal cost is high, and large-scale, non-interactive key initialization is difficult to achieve. The prior art lacks a systematic solution that enables root of trust to be planted in verifiable physical entities and enables efficient and secure presetting and dynamic updating of key seeds (i.e., root of trust) for mass terminals. How to safely initialize an unclonable, updatable cryptographic substrate on a mass device is a critical engineering challenge that the prior art has failed to effectively address. Disclosure of Invention Based on the technical problems in the background technology, the invention provides a secure key distribution system, a secure key distribution method and a secure key distribution chip based on a physical random entropy source. The invention provides a secure key distribution system based on a physical random entropy source, which comprises: a root physical entropy source for generating and providing a main entropy pool; At least one trusted filling station configured to obtain entropy material from the main entropy pool and to securely fill it to a terminal device; the system comprises a plurality of terminal devices, a plurality of secure charging stations and a plurality of secure charging stations, wherein a special secure chip is arranged in each terminal device, and a local entropy pool which is injected by the trusted charging stations and is bound with the trusted charging stations is stored in a secure memory of the chip; The control center is used for managing the identity of the terminal and the communication strategy; Wherein the two communicating terminal devices are configured to extract identical entropy data segments from the respective local entropy pools by performing identical deterministic synchronization functions based on a shared synchronization seed and to generate identical session keys accordingly. Further, the trusted filling station is a plurality of sites deployed in a distributed manner. Further, the local entropy pool is cryptographically bound with hardware unique identity information of the special security chip. The system further comprises a quantum key distribution network, wherein the control center is configured to acquire a quantum key from the quantum key distribution network, instruct target terminal equipment to receive the quantum key, bind the quantum key through chip identity and then integrate the quantum key into the local entropy pool as a new part. Further, the special security chip comprises a physical security domain and a general computation domain which are isolated by hardware, and the execution of the deterministic synchronization function and the access operation to the local entropy pool are limited to be completed in the physical security domain. Further, the physical security domain and the general purpose computing domain are connected by a unidirectional isolation interface configured to allow data to flow only from the physical security domain to the general purpose computing domain. Further, the synchronization seed is securely transmitted by a key derived from a local entropy pool preset by both parties of the communication. A key distribution method based on the system as described above, comprising the steps of: The first terminal generates a synchronous seed; After the first terminal obtains the authorization, the synchronous seed is sent to a second terminal safely; The first terminal and the second terminal respectively calculate by using the same synchronization function according to the synchronization seeds to obtain the same entropy segment locator; the first terminal and the second terminal read the same target entropy data segment from the respective pre-stored local entropy pools according to the locator; And the first terminal and the second terminal derive the same session key based on the target entropy section. Further, the calculation of the synchronization function depends on a master synchronization key preset in a security chip dedicated to both terminals and bound to the respective local entropy pools. A dedicated security chip for use in a system as described above, said chip being integrated in a single silicon substrate, comprising: A physical security domain, in which a hardware identity module, a true random number generator, a secure memory, a secure injection interface, and a synchroniz