CN-122008231-A - Safety control method and system for preventing industrial robot from being dropped by misoperation

CN122008231ACN 122008231 ACN122008231 ACN 122008231ACN-122008231-A

Abstract

The invention discloses a robot system with protection against misoperation falling and a use method thereof. The method comprises the steps of configuring an output signal related to clamping jaw control into a read-only mode by rewriting a bottom layer parameter file of a robot control system so as to inhibit manual forced output or false key triggering, developing a position checking function module, inputting a target coordinate X, acquiring a current actual coordinate Y of the robot, calculating a difference Z between X and Y in translation, gesture and external axis dimension, integrating checking logic in a loosening or releasing control program, allowing an action signal to be output only when the difference Z is within a preset tolerance range N (such as 0.1 mm), and packaging the control logic into an encrypted function module. The invention starts from the two aspects of bottom layer authority and space position accurate verification, fundamentally eliminates the falling accident of workpieces or fixtures caused by manual misoperation, realizes zero-falling protection, does not need to additionally increase a sensor, and takes both the safety and the operation convenience of the system into consideration.

Inventors

WANG HONGWEI
ZHANG PENGKUI
SHI FUJUN
LIAO LINHUA
XIANG HAIJING

Assignees

东风设备制造有限公司

Dates

Publication Date: 20260512
Application Date: 20260325

Claims (9)

1. The safety control method for preventing the misoperation of the industrial robot from dropping is characterized by comprising the following steps of: S1, directly triggering an action signal of a clamping jaw through an external physical key or an interface shortcut key is forbidden by rewriting a bottom layer parameter file related to the action of the clamping jaw in a robot control system, so that the action signal of the clamping jaw can be triggered and output only through a preset control program; S2, when a clamping jaw action instruction containing a target coordinate X is received, acquiring a reference coordinate system F corresponding to the target coordinate X, and calculating an actual coordinate Y of the robot under the reference coordinate system F at present; S3, calculating a difference Z between the target coordinate X and the actual coordinate Y, and judging whether the difference Z is within a preset tolerance range N; S4, if the difference Z is within the tolerance range N, checking to pass, allowing the control program to output a corresponding clamping jaw action signal, and if the difference Z exceeds the tolerance range N, checking to fail, intercepting the clamping jaw action signal and terminating program execution.
2. The safety control method according to claim 1, wherein in the step S1, the output end attribute related to the loosening signal and/or the releasing signal in the robot system bottom layer parameter file is modified to be in a read-only mode so as to shield the direct control authority of the corresponding jaw control shortcut button on the robot demonstrator.
3. The safety control method according to claim 1, wherein in the step S2: the reference coordinate system F includes at least a tool coordinate system Toolx and a workpiece coordinate system Basex; The coordinates (X, Y) and the difference Z comprise spatial position data and attitude data, and specifically comprise translation coordinate values of an X axis, a Y axis and a Z axis, euler angle rotation values of A, B, C and coordinate values of external axes E1, E2 and E3.
4. The safety control method according to claim 3, wherein in the step S3, specific judgment logic for judging whether the difference Z is within a preset tolerance range N is as follows: Calculating the absolute value of each element (x, y, Z, a, b, c, E1, E2, E3) in the difference Z; comparing the tolerance range N with the absolute value of each element; And if and only if the conditions that the level is Z.x is less than or equal to N and the level is Z.y is less than or equal to N and the level is Z.z is less than or equal to N and the level is Z.a is less than or equal to N and the level is Z.b is less than or equal to N and the level is Z.c is less than or equal to N and the level is Z.E1 is less than or equal to N and the level is Z.E2 is less than or equal to N and the level is Z.E3 is less than or equal to N are met, determining that the difference Z is within a preset tolerance range N, returning a verification passing signal, and otherwise returning a verification failing signal.
5. The security control method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, further comprising the steps of packaging and encrypting: Packaging the coordinate acquisition, position verification and condition execution logic in the steps S2 to S4 into independent function functional blocks; Invoking the function block in a jaw loosening program section or a jaw disengaging program section of the robot control clamping jaw; and (5) carrying out encryption processing on the packaged function blocks to prevent unauthorized tampering.
6. The safety control method according to claim 1, wherein the preset tolerance range N has a value of 0.1mm.
7. A safety control system for preventing an industrial robot from being dropped by a malfunction, characterized by being applied to perform the safety control method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, the system comprising: The bottom layer permission limiting module is used for rewriting bottom layer parameter files related to the movements of the clamping jaws in the robot control system, and prohibiting the direct triggering of the movement signals of the clamping jaws through external physical keys or interface shortcut keys, so that the movement signals can be triggered and output only through a preset control program; The position acquisition module is used for acquiring a reference coordinate system F corresponding to the target coordinate X when receiving a clamping jaw action instruction containing the target coordinate X, and calculating an actual coordinate Y of the robot under the reference coordinate system F at present; The position verification module is used for calculating a difference Z between the target coordinate X and the actual coordinate Y and judging whether absolute values of various parameters of the difference Z are smaller than or equal to a preset tolerance range N; And the action execution module is used for responding to the judging result of the position checking module, outputting a corresponding clamping jaw action signal to control the clamping jaw action if the judging result is within the tolerance range N, and intercepting the signal, terminating the program and triggering an alarm if the judging result is beyond the tolerance range N.
8. An industrial robot, comprising: The mechanical arm and the clamping jaw or the quick-change disc arranged at the tail end of the mechanical arm; a controller comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor implements the safety control method for preventing the misoperation drop of the industrial robot according to any one of claims 1 to 6 when executing the computer program; The demonstrator is in communication connection with the controller, a shortcut control button for directly and forcedly outputting a clamping jaw action signal is cancelled on an interface of the demonstrator, and an interactive interface for calling a preset clamping jaw control program is changed into the interface.
9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that a computer program is stored thereon, which, when being executed by a processor, implements the steps of the safety control method for preventing an industrial robot from being dropped by misoperation according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

Description

Safety control method and system for preventing industrial robot from being dropped by misoperation Technical Field The invention belongs to the technical field of industrial robots, and particularly discloses a safety control method and a system for preventing an industrial robot from being dropped by misoperation. Background Nowadays, industrial robots are widely used in various fields of modern industrial production and manufacture, and carry heavy and complex works such as handling, assembly, welding, etc. In industrial robot applications, the robot tip is typically equipped with a clamping jaw or tool side quick change disc for gripping and placing various parts. However, safety issues are increasingly pronounced during the routine teaching, program debugging and manual intervention operations of robots. One of the most important potential safety hazards is that when an operator operates the robot demonstrator, misoperation is very easy to occur due to fatigue, vision shielding, key misoperation and other reasons, so that the robot accidentally executes an instruction of loose grasp or release quick-change disc at a non-preset position. The misoperation can directly lead to falling of parts or tools on the clamping jaw, the workpiece is scrapped, the grippers are damaged and peripheral equipment is damaged if the workpiece is light, and serious casualties can be caused if the workpiece is heavy. The risk and the destructive nature of such drop accidents increase exponentially, especially when robots handle heavy workpieces weighing several hundred kilograms and even tons. In order to reduce the falling risk caused by the misoperation, the following two conventional safety protection methods are mainly adopted in the automation industry at present, but the following two conventional safety protection methods have obvious limitations and disadvantages: the first prior art approach is to employ a "safe zone limiting method". According to the method, a three-dimensional safety area is set for each device which needs to be serviced by the robot in a background program, and whether the robot is currently located in the safety area is judged in real time. The system allows the operator to execute the command to release or disengage the grip only when the robot is within the safe area. However, this method has many vulnerabilities in practical applications: And the protection is in a vacuum period, namely, in the early stage of project debugging, when a safety area is not set to be finished or a protection program is not fully started, the system lacks a protection mechanism, and misoperation and falling accidents still possibly occur at any time. The number of areas is limited by the bottom layer setting of the robot control system, and generally, only a limited number (such as 8) of safety areas can be set, and the number of devices on an actual production line often far exceeds the limit, so that part of stations cannot be protected. The protection accuracy is insufficient, and the set safety area range is usually far larger than the actual material receiving size of the equipment per se in order to contain the physical boundary of the equipment. Therefore, even if the tail end of the robot is located in the safety area, the workpiece still falls off in the high altitude in the safety area due to misoperation as long as the tail end of the robot is not located in the accurate placement point, and zero falling cannot be achieved. The second prior art method employs a "PLC peel control method". The method cuts off the authority of the robot to directly control the clamping jaw at the system level. When the clamping jaw needs to be operated, the robot is only responsible for sending a request signal to an external PLC, and then an operator needs to perform secondary confirmation and manual operation on a touch screen interface of the PLC so as to realize the loosening of the clamping jaw or the detachment of the quick-change disc. Although this method increases the operation threshold to some extent, thereby reducing the erroneous operation, it also brings about a new problem: The false touch cannot be stopped, namely the touch screen interface still has the risk of false touch with small probability, and the possibility of false operation cannot be fundamentally eliminated. The operation is complicated, new hidden dangers are introduced, the on-site teaching debugging process becomes extremely complicated, and two operators are usually required to cooperate (one operator operates the PLC touch screen beside the control cabinet, and the other operator holds the teaching device to operate the robot). Because blind areas exist in two-place operation, two people cannot see each other, and the robot is easy to squeeze or strike an operator of a handheld demonstrator when the clamping jaws act due to unsmooth communication or improper matching of operation time, and new personal safety hidden trouble is introduced.