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EP-4741871-A1 - METHOD AND DEVICE FOR SECURING A RADAR SENSOR COMPONENT

EP4741871A1EP 4741871 A1EP4741871 A1EP 4741871A1EP-4741871-A1

Abstract

Method for safeguarding a radar sensor component (42) comprising a plurality of subsystems (44; 64; 70; 76). A subsystem (70) to be monitored comprises at least one digital signal processor (72) and a working memory (74) in which raw data (86) acquired by a radar hardware component during radar evaluation using the radar sensor component (42) can be stored in a multidimensional matrix. During radar evaluation, artificial object data (88), which generates at least one artificial object in the radar evaluation with a predetermined evaluation result, is fed into the working memory (74) in addition to the raw data (86) from the radar hardware component. After input, it is checked whether the predetermined evaluation result for the at least one artificial object is achieved during radar evaluation.

Inventors

  • Weißbach, Martin
  • Brühl, Steffen
  • BAUER, PETER
  • Hoberg, Daniel
  • WIETFELD, MARTIN

Assignees

  • Pilz GmbH & Co. KG

Dates

Publication Date
20260513
Application Date
20251105

Claims (11)

  1. Method for securing a radar sensor component (42) comprising a plurality of subsystems (44; 64; 70; 76), wherein a subsystem (70) to be monitored comprises at least one digital signal processor (72) and a working memory (74) in which raw data (86) acquired by a radar hardware component during radar evaluation using the radar sensor component (42) can be stored in a multidimensional matrix, wherein, during radar evaluation, artificial object data (88), which generates at least one artificial object in the radar evaluation with a predetermined evaluation result, are fed into the working memory (74) in addition to the raw data (86) of the radar hardware component, wherein, after feeding, it is checked whether the predetermined evaluation result for the at least one artificial object is achieved during radar evaluation.
  2. Method according to claim 1, wherein the radar evaluation includes a linear sequence with sequentially successive process steps, wherein the artificial object data (88) go through each of the successive process steps.
  3. Method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the radar evaluation comprises two or more parallel, linear sequences with sequentially successive process steps, wherein artificial object data are formed for each of the parallel sequences.
  4. Method according to one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the radar hardware component (42) cyclically writes raw data (86) into the main memory (74) for radar evaluation and the artificial object data (88) are cyclically fed into the main memory (74).
  5. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the working memory (74) is divided into a first area and a second area, wherein in the first The first area contains raw data that can be assigned to a spatial monitoring area, and the second area contains raw data that can be assigned to an area outside the spatial monitoring area, with the artificial object data (88) being fed into the second area.
  6. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the artificial object data (88) define a distance, an angle and/or a speed of the at least one artificial object.
  7. Method according to one of claims 1 to 6, wherein in a setup operation a monitoring area is recorded with the radar sensor component (42) in order to determine real recognition data of static objects in the monitoring area, and wherein in a monitoring operation the artificial object data (88) have the real recognition data.
  8. Method according to one of claims 1 to 7, wherein in a case where the predetermined evaluation result for the at least one artificial object is not obtained during radar evaluation, a safety-oriented function is performed, in particular a technical system is put into a safe state.
  9. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, wherein the artificial object data represent special objects that arise from an interaction between a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna.
  10. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein the radar sensor component (42) is an integrated circuit, in particular a single-chip system in which the plurality of subsystems (44; 64; 70; 76) is integrated.
  11. Device for safeguarding a radar sensor component (42) comprising a plurality of subsystems (44; 64; 70; 76), wherein a subsystem (70) to be monitored comprises at least one digital signal processor (72) and a working memory (74) in which, during a radar evaluation, The device uses the radar sensor component (42) to store raw data (86) acquired by a radar hardware component in a multidimensional matrix, wherein the device has a processing unit which is configured to feed artificial object data (88), which generates at least one artificial object in the radar evaluation with a predetermined evaluation result, into the working memory (74) in addition to the raw data (86) of the radar hardware component during radar evaluation, and to check after feeding whether the predetermined evaluation result for the at least one artificial object is achieved during radar evaluation.

Description

The present disclosure relates to a method and a device for securing a radar sensor component. Radar sensors, especially industrial mmWave radar sensors, are used in automation technology as reliable radar sensors for the effective monitoring of protected areas. These sensors offer the high reliability and accuracy required in safety-critical applications to prevent accidents and ensure the safety of machinery and technical equipment. Radar sensors monitor protected areas by detecting movements and objects within defined zones. They continuously emit signals in the millimeter-wave range, which are reflected by objects and received by the sensors. The reflected signals are evaluated to determine distance, The system determines the speed and direction of objects. If an object enters a danger zone, it can react and bring a technical system or machine to a safe state to prevent accidents. The accuracy of the radar sensors ensures that even small and fast-moving objects are reliably detected. A key advantage of mmWave radar sensors is their insensitivity to external influences such as dust, dirt, rain, light, or sparks. While optical sensors often reach their limits and become unreliable under such conditions, radar sensors remain functional and precise. This robustness makes them ideal for use in harsh environments such as outdoor areas, heavy industry, and woodworking, where they ensure reliable monitoring even under adverse conditions. A radar sensor used in safety automation technology consists of several components that work together to ensure precise and reliable object detection. These components can include a transmitting and receiving antenna, a high-frequency front end, a digital signal processor (DSP), a microcontroller, memory modules, communication interfaces, a reliable power supply, and a robust housing. Parts of these components can be integrated into a so-called system-on-a-chip (SoC). Each component then forms a subsystem within the chip. The chips can be purchased ready-made and integrated into radar sensors. For safety-critical applications, each individual component must comply with normative requirements to obtain the corresponding approval for operation at a defined safety level. Examples of safety classifications include SIL (Safety Integrity Level) and ASIL (Automotive Safety Integrity Level). Both are classifications used in various safety standards to assess the safety level of systems. The SIL classification is defined in the IEC 61508 standard, which is used in industrial automation to determine the To ensure the functional safety of electrical and electronic systems. The ASIL classification is defined in the ISO 26262 standard, which is used in the automotive industry to ensure the functional safety of vehicle systems. A radar sensor can be certified for SIL and ASIL, e.g., SIL 2 or ASIL B, by verifying and validating its subsystems for safe operation as part of a safety function. In a single-chip system, the subsystems must be considered within the context of their role within the safety function to meet the safety requirements. For example, the radio frequency front end can be designed and tested to support the requirements of a SIL 2 or ASIL B safety function. Other critical areas of the single-chip system, such as the digital signal processor (DSP), cannot be directly certified as standalone components. They must be secured through additional measures by the system integrator or end user, such as the use of a separate safety CPU. For example, an additional CPU can monitor and verify ("recalculate") the DSP's computational results to ensure that the safety requirements are indeed met. Alternatively, individual subsystems can be designed with redundancy to meet the safety requirements of the overall function. By combining certified subsystems and additional safeguards, including the implementation of an external second channel, a radar sensor can meet the requirements of SIL2 and ASIL B. A second channel serves as a redundant system, monitoring and validating the calculations and functions of the primary system to ensure that any deviation or malfunction is detected and appropriate countermeasures are taken. This redundancy increases reliability and safety by reducing the probability of dangerous failures. However, implementing an external second channel is often associated with significant costs and effort. A second channel requires additional hardware, which not only incurs costs but also increases the space requirements and energy consumption of the system. The overall system load is increased. Furthermore, developing and integrating a second channel is technically complex and time-consuming, as it must be perfectly synchronized and calibrated with the primary system. This can be particularly problematic in cost-sensitive applications with limited space. Therefore, it is desirable to develop alternative backup methods that achieve similar levels of security but are more cost