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US-12621164-B2 - Systems and methods for authentication using antenna array geometries

US12621164B2US 12621164 B2US12621164 B2US 12621164B2US-12621164-B2

Abstract

In one embodiment, an authentication scheme ( 500 ) that combines chaotic antenna array geometries with pseudorandom pilot sequences and antenna array activation sequences is provided. A receiving device ( 110 A) receives a pilot signal ( 130 ) from a transmitting device ( 110 B) ( 501 ). The receiving device computes a unique signature ( 125 ) for the transmitting device that captures differences between the received signal and expected pilot signal ( 503 ). The differences may be due to a unique antenna array geometry of the transmitting device, a pseudorandom pilot sequence used by the transmitting device, and an antenna array activation sequence used by the transmitting device. Later, this computed unique signature may be used by other receiving devices to authenticate the transmitting device ( 505; 507 ).

Inventors

  • Murat Karabacak
  • Berker Pekoz
  • Gokhan Mumcu
  • Huseyin Arslan

Assignees

  • UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

Dates

Publication Date
20260505
Application Date
20220301

Claims (18)

  1. 1 . A method for authenticating a transmitting device by a receiving device using signatures, the method comprising: receiving a signal by a receiving device from a transmitting device, wherein the transmitting device transmitted the signal from a chaotic antenna array associated with the transmitting device; determining a difference between a reference signal and the received signal by the receiving device; using the determined difference as a signature for the chaotic antenna array of the transmitting device by the receiving device; comparing the signature to a plurality of signatures by the receiving device, wherein each signature of the plurality of signatures is associated with known transmitting device; based on the comparison, determining whether the signature matches any signature of the plurality of signatures by the receiving device; and if it is determined that the signature matches any signature of the plurality of signatures, authenticating the transmitting device.
  2. 2 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising: if it is determined that the signature does not match any signature of the plurality of signatures, not authenticating the transmitting device.
  3. 3 . The method of claim 2 , further comprising, if it is determined that the signature does not match any signature of the plurality of signatures, taking one or more cyber-physical actions.
  4. 4 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the reference signal is a pilot sequence.
  5. 5 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the chaotic antenna array has one or more errors.
  6. 6 . The method of claim 5 , wherein the one or more errors are intentionally randomized errors.
  7. 7 . The method of claim 5 , wherein the chaotic antenna array includes a plurality of elements and the one or more errors comprise errors due to a displacement of the elements or errors due to a shape of each antenna element.
  8. 8 . The method of claim 1 , wherein determining whether the signature matches any signature of the plurality of signatures comprises determining whether the signature is within a threshold of any signature of the plurality of signatures.
  9. 9 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising receiving the plurality of signatures.
  10. 10 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising: introducing error into an antenna array of the transmitting device to create the chaotic antenna array; causing the transmitting device to transmit a signal to the receiving device using the chaotic antenna array; based on the received signal, generating the signature for the chaotic antenna array of the transmitting device; adding the generated signature to the plurality of signatures; and distributing the plurality of signatures to a plurality of receiving devices to use to authenticate transmitting devices.
  11. 11 . A method for authenticating receiving devices comprising: introducing error into an antenna array of a transmitting device to create a chaotic antenna array of the transmitting device; causing the transmitting device to transmit a signal to a receiving device using the chaotic antenna array; determining a difference between a reference signal and the transmitted signal by the receiving device; using the determined difference as a signature for the chaotic antenna array of the transmitting device; adding the signature to a list of signatures, wherein each signature in the list of signatures is associated with a different transmitting device of a plurality of transmitting devices, wherein each transmitting device is associated with a different chaotic antenna array; and distributing the list of signatures to a plurality of receiving devices to use to authenticate transmitting devices.
  12. 12 . The method of claim 11 , wherein introducing error comprises introducing one or both of shape error or spacing error into the chaotic antenna array of the transmitting device.
  13. 13 . The method of claim 11 , wherein causing the transmitting device to transmit the signal to a receiving device comprises causing the transmitting device to transmit a pilot sequence that varies with time.
  14. 14 . The method of claim 13 , wherein the pilot sequence comprises one or more of non-sinusoidal wavelets, or a mixture of wavelets.
  15. 15 . The method of claim 13 , wherein transmitting the pilot sequence that varies with time comprises one or more of selectively activating and deactivating antenna elements of the chaotic antenna array while transmitting the pilot sequence, or varying a feed length with time.
  16. 16 . A receiving device comprising: an antenna; a storage comprising a plurality of signatures, wherein each signature is associated with a trusted transmitting device of a plurality of trusted transmitting devices; and at least one processor that: receives a signal from a chaotic antenna array of a transmitting device; determines a difference between a reference signal and the received signal; uses the determined difference as a signature for the chaotic antenna array of the transmitting device; compares the signature to the plurality of signatures; based on the comparison, determines whether the signature matches any signature of the plurality of signatures; and if it is determined that the signature matches any signature of the plurality of signatures, authenticate the transmitting device as a trusted transmitting device.
  17. 17 . The system of claim 16 , wherein the receiving device further: if it is determined that the signature does not match any signature of the plurality of signatures, taking one or more cyber-physical actions.
  18. 18 . The system of claim 16 , wherein the chaotic antenna array has one or more intentionally randomized errors.

Description

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS This application is a United States National Phase Patent Application of International Patent Application Number PCT/US2022/018260, filed on Mar. 1, 2022, which claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 63/154,992 filed on Mar. 1, 2021 and entitled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR AUTHENTICATION USING ANTENNA ARRAY GEOMETRIES.” The disclosures of which are hereby incorporated by reference in their entireties. BACKGROUND The emergence of quantum computing has recently shown that currently used conventional encryption techniques may be cracked with ease in the near future. This pushed researchers to finding new horizons that satisfy security requirements through the use of non-cryptographic approaches, such as utilizing the physical layer (PHY) properties of the system or machine learning (ML) techniques to infer presence of adversaries and defend accordingly. Quantum password cracking aside, PHY authentication becomes critical in authenticating simplex broadcasts in which cryptographic approaches cannot be utilized, such as spoofed global positioning system (GPS) signals. Layered security approaches have been shown to be redundant and inflexible for future network structures. Authenticating user equipments (UEs) using their PHY characteristics in developing a PHY security (PLS) approach has been gaining traction. The idea of extracting artifacts caused by imperfections in the source network interface card (NIC) to authenticate devices has been around for more than a decade. Channel similarities in addition to the RF fingerprint of the device may be also utilized in the control-layer based authenticator that aims to replace high-latency connections to remotely located authentication servers with local verification among fifth generation (5G) heterogeneous network (HetNet) access points (APs). Antenna array geometry optimization literature has historically focused on designing “smart” or adaptive antenna arrays with improved far or near-field spatiospectral localization. Although PLS using multiple antennas was also introduced more than a decade ago when signals received from multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) transmitters are authenticated using the spatiospectrotemporal correlation of the wireless channel. However, due to the randomness of the channel this method can provide limited control on spatiospectrotemporal signatures. Despite the further studies of PHY security of MIMO systems, the literature for PHY authentication for this systems remains underdeveloped to date. SUMMARY In one embodiment, a novel authentication scheme that combines chaotic antenna array geometries with pseudorandom pilot sequences and antenna array activation sequences is provided. By combining chaotic antenna array geometries, pseudorandom pilot sequences, and antenna array activation sequences unclonable authentication devices are achieved, even when an adversary eavesdrops the message exchange or figures out the unique antenna array geometry by x-ray radiography. As will be described further below, the proposed scheme is both accurate and scalable. For example, the proposed authentication scheme may provide a 1% false authentication rate at 10 dB SNR, while achieving a missed authentication rate of less than 1%. Additional advantages of the invention will be set forth in part in the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by practice of the invention. The advantages of the invention will be realized and attained by means of the elements and combinations particularly pointed out in the appended claims. It is to be understood that both the foregoing general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only and are not restrictive of the invention, as claimed. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS The accompanying figures, which are incorporated herein and form part of the specification, illustrate a document attachment system and method. Together with the description, the figures further serve to explain the principles of the document attachment system and method described herein and thereby enable a person skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the document attachment system and method. FIG. 1 is an illustration of environment for authenticating devices; FIG. 2 is an illustration of a chaotic antenna array geometry for a 4×4 antenna array; FIG. 3 is a graph illustrating missed detection rates; FIG. 4 is a graph illustrating false detection rates when receiving only noise for various Mn and false alarm targets; FIG. 5 is an illustration of an example method for transmitting device authentication using signatures; FIG. 6. Is an illustration of an example method for generating a list of transmitting device signatures to use for transmitting device authentication; and FIG. 7 shows an exemplary computing environment in which example embodiments and aspects may be implemented. DETAILED DESCRIP