US-20260127564-A1 - Peer-To-Peer Electronic Data Exchange

Abstract

A system and method for generating, issuing, and recording value transactions in a peer-to-peer data exchange based on a proof-of-data blockchain. The system enables users to open datastores and receive value, with value transactions recorded on the proof-of-data blockchain. Recorders of value compete to obtain blockchain recording rights by issuing value to users who achieve the highest proof-of-data scores. The system supports recording blocks of variable size to enhance scalability and efficiency

Inventors

• Altaf Hadi

Assignees

• Altaf Hadi

Dates

Publication Date

20260507

Application Date

20250708

Claims (15)

1. 1 . A peer-to-peer electronic data exchange system, comprising: a plurality of interconnected nodes, each node comprising one or more processors; a memory resource configures as a memory bank accessible by the one or more processors of the node; a network fabric operable to facilitate communication and data exchange among the plurality of nodes; wherein the memory of at least one node stores instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors of the node, cause the distributed peer to peer data exchange system to perform operations comprising: a) maintaining a decentralized blockchain transaction layer configured to record monetary and non-monetary transactions on variable-size blocks; b) operating a witness chain layer comprising a plurality of user Datastores, each Datastore storing data assets and maintaining a Data Truth Index (DTI) score; c) managing a value issuing layer comprising miners competing for block mining rights; d) executing proof-of-data consensus operations, the consensus operations comprising: i) identifying n qualified user datastores with individual DTI scores β 1 , β 2 , . . . β n during a mining window δ; ii) calculating a combined DTI score α=Σ i=1 k n i representing total available authentic data value; iii) receiving basetoken offers from competing miners to qualified users; iv) processing user selections of preferred miners through smart contract execution; v) calculating proof-of-data (scores for each miner where Ω=Σ i=1 k n i ′ and n′⊆n represents users accepting each miner's basetokens; enforcing the mathematical constraint Ω≤α; vi) determining the winning miner with the highest Ω score; and vii) granting exclusive mining rights to the winning miner for the next variable-size block.
2. 2 . The system of claim 1 , wherein one or more processors further executes DTI calculation operations comprising weighted verification algorithms that assign government agency credentials a weighting factor W 1 , healthcare entity data a weighting factor W 2 , financial institution verification a weighting factor W 3 , and behavioral data analysis a weighting factor W 4 , where W 1 +W 2 +W 3 +W 4 =1.0.
3. 3 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the memory stores tie-breaking algorithms that, when executed by the processor, apply weighted factors including network reliability metrics, constituent user count, aggregate economic value, and temporal priority to determine winners when multiple miners achieve equal Ω scores.
4. 4 . The system of claim 1 , wherein tie-breaking mechanisms for miners with equal Ω scores comprise weighted factors including network reliability history based on historical uptime percentages and failed transaction rates, user diversity weighting favoring miners with broader constituent user bases, economic value weighting based on aggregate Datastore wealth of constituent users, and temporal priority weighting favoring longer network participation history.
5. 5 . The system of claim 1 , wherein each Datastore comprises a Datastore engine with artificial intelligence capabilities for analyzing data authenticity and calculating DTI scores, and automation capabilities for managing basetoken offers and smart contract execution during the mining competition process.
6. 6 . The system of claim 1 , wherein each mining window δ comprises sequential phases including an offer distribution phase allowing miners to broadcast basetoken offers to qualified users, a user evaluation phase enabling users to analyze and select preferred miners, a score calculation phase for real-time Ω score aggregation and validation, and a winner determination phase applying tie-breaking algorithms when necessary.
7. 7 . The system of claim 1 , wherein qualified users must achieve a wealth germination DTI threshold before becoming eligible to receive basetoken offers and contribute their DTI scores to miners' Ω calculations, preventing system gaming while ensuring authentic user participation in the consensus mechanism.
8. 8 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the proof-of-data consensus mechanism operates through temporal evolution phases including time ψ marking the transition from system-controlled mining to competitive mining when sufficient miners with Bitcoin Data (BTD) token holdings emerge, and time θ representing theoretical global adoption completion with random miner selection during intervals having insufficient new qualified users.
9. 9 . The system of claim 1 , wherein transaction fees are calculated using segregated witness methodology with 100% fee distribution to winning miners without system retention, and fee structures are democratically adjustable through miner and user voting mechanisms.
10. 10 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the mathematical constraint Ω≤α is continuously enforced throughout each mining window to ensure no individual miner can accumulate more DTI score than the total available from all qualified users, with real-time validation by distributed network nodes including full nodes, super nodes, and light nodes.
11. 11 . A computer-implemented method for proof-of-data consensus comprising: establishing a standardized block mining window δ of predetermined time duration; scanning user datastores to identify n qualified users having Data Truth Index (DTI) scores exceeding a wealth germination threshold; calculating individual DTI scores β1, β2, . . . βn through weighted verification from government agencies, healthcare entities, and behavioral data analysis; computing a combined DTI score α=Σ i=1 k n i representing total available authentic data value; broadcasting mining window initialization to competing miners with sufficient Bitcoin Data (BTD) token holdings; receiving strategic basetoken offers from miners targeting qualified users; processing user evaluation and selection of preferred miners through secure Datastore communication channels; executing smart contracts to transfer agreed basetoken amounts and allocate user DTI scores; calculating real-time proof-of-data (scores for each miner where Ω=Σ i=1 k n i ′; validating mathematical constraint Ω≤α through distributed network nodes; applying tie-breaking mechanisms when multiple miners achieve equal Ω scores; determining the winning miner through argmax (Ω) calculation; granting exclusive variable-size block creation rights to the winning miner; and distributing 100% of transaction fees to the winning miner with zero block rewards.
12. 12 . The method of claim 11 , wherein the DTI scores are calculated through weighted verification from multiple sources including government agencies depositing official identification credentials, healthcare entities providing DNA data and medical records, financial institutions providing identity confirmation, and behavioral data analysis of GPS patterns and communication records.
13. 13 . The method of claim 11 , further comprising applying comprehensive tie-breaking mechanisms when multiple miners achieve equal Ω scores, including network reliability weighting based on historical performance metrics, constituent user count weighting favoring broader user bases, economic value weighting based on aggregate user wealth, and temporal priority weighting favoring longer network participation history.
14. 14 . The method of claim 11 , wherein the wealth germination threshold prevents data monetization until users achieve a minimum DTI score requirement, enables basetoken receipt and proof-of-data participation upon threshold achievement, and includes system-generated basetoken airdrops to newly qualified users during network bootstrap phases.
15. 15 . The method of claim 11 , further comprising temporal evolution management including transitioning from system-controlled mining to competitive mining at time ψ when sufficient miners with BTD holdings emerge, detecting theoretical global adoption completion at time Θ when no new datastores are expected, treating Θ as a spurious event if new users join after mining window absences, and implementing random miner selection during intervals with sufficient new qualified users.

Description

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 17/486,822 filed on Sep. 27, 2021, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 16/602,585 filed on Nov. 5, 2019, which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Applications No. 62/819,383 filed on Mar. 15, 2019 and No. 62/755,997 filed on Nov. 5, 2018, the disclosures of which are hereby incorporated by reference. TECHNICAL FIELD This disclosure generally relates to generating and issuing value to users, and more particularly to proof of data consensus based blockchain recorders recording transactions on variable size blocks real and near real time. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION In the current digital economy, data has emerged as the most valuable commodity-often referred to as “the new oil.” Major technology corporations like Facebook and Google generate billions in revenue by harvesting and monetizing user data, yet the individuals who generate this valuable information receive no monetary compensation. This creates a fundamental inequity where users provide the raw material (their personal data) but are excluded from the economic benefits derived from it. Consumer privacy exists only in theory in today's digital landscape. Sophisticated artificial intelligence technologies operate in stealth mode, harvesting the most private and intimate details of consumer life without meaningful consent or compensation. Users have lost sovereign control over their own data assets, with centralized platforms maintaining complete authority over data access, usage, and monetization while users bear the privacy costs and security risks. Despite significant technological advancement, cryptocurrency faces major adoption barriers that prevent its integration into everyday commerce: Cryptocurrency is widely feared, misunderstood, and dismissed as facilitating money laundering, despite traditional fiat currencies like the US Dollar actually serving as the preferred medium for illicit financial activities. Critics point to cryptocurrency market volatility since December 2017 peaks yet fail to acknowledge that traditional currencies like the US Dollar have lost substantial purchasing power over time. For example, the USD declined over 78% against the Swiss Franc between 1953 (1 USD=4.3 CHF) and 2018 (1 USD=0.92 CHF), making Americans progressively poorer. Despite technological capabilities, cryptocurrency adoption in actual commercial transactions remains virtually nonexistent on a global scale. Existing proof-of-work based cryptocurrencies contribute significantly to environmental degradation through excessive energy consumption: Research published in Nature Climate Change warns that “bitcoin emissions alone could push global warming above 2° C.,” with Forbes characterizing Bitcoin as potentially “the nail in the coffin of climate change.” Even when renewable energy sources power cryptocurrency mining, the colossal energy consumption represents opportunity cost—the same energy could provide clean water for over 750 million people and prevent 2-5 million deaths from contaminated drinking water. Traditional proof-of-work consensus mechanisms create bottlenecks that prevent real-time transaction processing, limiting practical commercial applications. Existing blockchain technologies suffer from fundamental limitations that prevent widespread adoption including, for example: a) most blockchain networks require significant time for transaction confirmation, making them impractical for real-time commerce applications; b). rigid block size limitations create processing bottlenecks during high transaction volumes; c) despite decentralized architectures, effective control often concentrates in mining pools or platform operators. A handful of mining pools collectively control most of Bitcoin's computational power This concentration raises concerns about the potential for collusion, censorship, or even a 51% attack; d) Current systems fail to provide mechanisms for ordinary users to monetize their data contributions to network value. The absence of DTI scoring systems and proof-of-data consensus mechanisms prevents users from earning compensation for their authentic data contributions; and e) The absence of comprehensive regulatory compliance frameworks prevents legitimate cryptocurrency adoption. Current systems lack the automated compliance mechanisms required for global operation. There are problems with the missing infrastructure for Data Monetization including, for example: a) Current platforms cannot distinguish between authentic user data and artificially generated information, creating opportunities for system gaming and fraud; and b) raditional platforms lack the transaction fee structures and revenue distribution systems necessary for fair user compensation. The comprehensive fee structure (FIG. 13) reveals the complexity required for equitable data monetization. There is a need for innovative data mo