US-20260128893-A1 - BEI PRIVACY-CONTROLLABLE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM WITH SOVEREIGN DIGITAL PARCELS, NON-BYPASSABLE RUNTIME ENFORCEMENT, AND AUDIT-COMMIT GATING

US20260128893A1US 20260128893 A1US20260128893 A1US 20260128893A1US-20260128893-A1

Abstract

A computer-implemented privacy-controllable compliance system manages protected content associated with a Behavioral Economics Identity (BEI) principal using a sovereign digital parcel architecture. Sensitive content is partitioned into independently encrypted segments stored in a vault realm such that direct storage access yields ciphertext. A runtime enforcement engine executes at a lowest permitted interface for decryption or high-impact operations and validates time-bounded capability tokens that cryptographically bind at least a purpose, an explicit scope (segment identifiers and/or segment-count cap), a time constraint, governance evidence, and an audit reference. The system enforces an audit-commit condition in which an operation completes only after successful generation of an append-only, tamper-evident audit record. This architecture separates custody from access, prevents bypass via administrative privileges, and enforces minimal, proportional disclosure.

Inventors

FURONG BEI

Assignees

FURONG BEI

Dates

Publication Date: 20260507
Application Date: 20260107

Claims (20)

1 . A computer-implemented privacy-controllable compliance system for managing protected content associated with a sovereign digital parcel, the system comprising one or more processors and memory storing instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the system to: (i) define, via a namespace boundary module, a plurality of security realms each addressable via a respective namespace identifier; (ii) partition, via a segmented vault module, data associated with the sovereign digital parcel into a plurality of independently encrypted segments and store ciphertext corresponding to the segments in a vault realm such that direct access to the storage medium yields unreadable data; (iii) receive, via a runtime enforcement engine, a request for a target operation and validate a capability token associated with the request, wherein the capability token cryptographically binds at least a purpose, a scope defining an explicit segment list or a segment-count cap, a time constraint, and an audit reference; (iv) generate, via an immutable audit module, an append-only, tamper-evident audit record associated with the target operation; and (v) enforce a non-bypassable disclosure constraint at a lowest permitted interface that executes decryption or commits the target operation by rejecting any request that lacks a valid capability token or fails to satisfy an audit-commit condition, thereby preventing bypass via administrative privileges.
2 . The system of claim 1 , wherein at least one said namespace identifier comprises a domain name acting as an ecosystem component, and wherein the domain name comprises at least one of: (i) a protocol root domain name bei.app; (ii) a trust interface domain name btrust.app or ztrust.app; (iii) a vault domain name cdb.app or xdb.app; (iv) an enforcement engine identifier helixclamp.com; (v) a container definition identifier sovparcel.com; (vi) a settlement domain name atms.com; or (vii) a developer tools identifier jwts.app.
3 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the audit-commit condition requires that the target operation is committed or decrypted data is returned only after the immutable audit module confirms successful writing of the audit record.
4 . The system of claim 1 , further comprising a time attestation module configured to verify a time-slice certificate (TSC) or time-window proof, and wherein the runtime enforcement engine rejects the capability token if the time constraint is outside a valid window defined by the TSC.
5 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the capability token further binds governance evidence comprising a cryptographic proof of a threshold number of authorizations (k-of-n).
6 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the system enforces a segment-ladder logic, such that a subsequent request to access segments exceeding the scope or the segment-count cap of a current capability token requires issuance of a new capability token and generation of a new audit record.
7 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the lowest permitted interface is implemented within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or Hardware Security Module (HSM), such that decryption keys are physically isolated from an operating system of the vault realm and are inaccessible to database administrators.
8 . The system of claim 1 , further comprising a high-throughput optimization wherein the audit-commit condition is satisfied via a trusted local buffer within the TEE to enable low-latency execution while maintaining tamper-evidence.
9 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the capability token includes a cryptographic signature covering the bound purpose, scope, time, and audit reference, such that modification of any bound field invalidates the token.
10 . A computer-implemented method for enforcing non-bypassable access control over a sovereign digital parcel, the method comprising: (a) partitioning sensitive content into a plurality of independently encrypted segments stored in a vault realm; (b) receiving, at a runtime enforcement engine, a request to decrypt a subset of segments or perform a high-impact operation; (c) validating a capability token provided with the request, wherein validating includes cryptographically verifying that the capability token binds a purpose, a limited scope, a time window, and an audit reference; (d) verifying an audit-commit condition, wherein the audit-commit condition requires generating an append-only, tamper-evident audit record prior to or atomically with execution of the request; and (e) executing the decryption or the high-impact operation at a lowest permitted interface only if the capability token is valid and the audit-commit condition is satisfied; wherein any attempt to access the segments or perform the operation via database administrative privileges without the capability token is rejected by the runtime enforcement engine.
11 . The method of claim 10 , wherein the scope of the capability token defines a segment-count cap, and the method further comprises rejecting a decryption request that exceeds the segment-count cap unless a renewed authorization process generates a new capability token.
12 . The method of claim 10 , wherein validating the capability token further comprises verifying a time-slice attestation referenced by the capability token, ensuring the request occurs within a strictly defined temporal window.
13 . The method of claim 10 , wherein the high-impact operation comprises a key rotation, a policy modification, or an export operation, and wherein the method further requires verifying a threshold number of cryptographic signatures referenced by the capability token.
14 . The method of claim 10 , further comprising mapping the vault realm to a dedicated namespace identifier comprising cdb.app or xdb.app, mapping a user interface to a distinct trust namespace identifier comprising btrust.app, mapping the enforcement engine to helixclamp.com, and enforcing cross-origin policy checks between said namespaces.
15 . The method of claim 10 , wherein the audit record comprises a cryptographic hash of the capability token, request parameters, and a timestamp, linked to a previous audit record to form a hash chain.
16 . The method of claim 10 , further comprising providing a minimal disclosure view, wherein the decrypted subset of segments is rendered in a non-exportable format within a controlled environment, optionally including a forensic marking layer encoding an audit identifier for leak attribution.
17 . The method of claim 10 , wherein validating the capability token includes verifying an environment constraint requiring that the decryption is performed within a designated secure enclave or Hardware Security Module (HSM).
18 . A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing a capability token data structure, the data structure comprising: a purpose field defining a specific compliance or operational basis; a scope field defining an explicit list of authorized encrypted segments or a numeric disclosure limit; a time field defining a validity interval and referencing a time-slice proof; a governance field containing cryptographic evidence of multi-party authorization; and an audit reference field linking the capability token to an immutable audit log; wherein the data structure is cryptographically signed such that modification of any field invalidates the capability token, and wherein the data structure is configured to be consumed by a runtime enforcement engine.
19 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 18 , wherein the governance field further comprises a veto proof indicating the absence of a blocking signal from a designated veto authority.
20 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 18 , wherein the scope field implements a ladder constraint requiring that an escalation in access privileges is represented by a distinct newly issued data structure rather than an update to an existing data structure.

Description

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 19/056,745, filed Feb. 19, 2025, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference for all purposes to the extent not inconsistent with the present disclosure. Certain other applications under common inventorship and/or common ownership may be related in subject matter to the present disclosure and may be co-pending. Such related applications, if any, are identified for technical background and ecosystem context only, and are not relied upon for priority, domestic benefit, or foreign priority in the present application unless expressly identified as such in the Application Data Sheet (ADS) and/or in this Cross-Reference section. Identification of any such applications is not an admission that any such document constitutes prior art to the present application. FIELD This disclosure relates to computer-implemented security, privacy, compliance, and interoperability foundations centered on Behavioral Economic Identity (BEI). Embodiments include sovereign digital parcels (also referred to as treasure-bowl parcels and virgin-land parcels), segmented encryption and indexed point-view disclosure, non-bypassable runtime capability-token enforcement at the lowest permitted interface, time-window attestation, and append-only tamper-evident audit commitment with audit-commit semantics. BACKGROUND Sensitive data systems and high-impact operational systems routinely face confidentiality, integrity, and accountability failures. A recurring failure pattern is standing privilege equals standing plaintext, where administrator roles, operational tooling, or database access indirectly results in broad plaintext disclosure. Another recurring pattern is compliance by bulk export, where audits, investigations, and regulatory inquiries trigger broad sharing of sensitive data to reduce operational friction, increasing breach risk and undermining data minimization. Encryption at rest and key management services are valuable but insufficient when privileged runtime paths can request decryption without binding the request to a specific purpose, constrained scope, time window, governance evidence, and immutable audit evidence. Additionally, when operational or administrative domains can bypass enforcement logic, the system becomes vulnerable to insider collusion and ransomware operators who obtain privileged credentials. Many systems cannot produce machine-verifiable evidence that an access or operation occurred within a bounded purpose, bounded scope, and bounded time, and that the action was committed to an append-only audit chain. Instead, systems rely on ad hoc logs or human narratives that are not robust and are difficult to reconcile across organizations. There remains a need for a practical foundation in which plaintext disclosure and high-impact actions are non-bypassably gated; disclosure is proportional through segment-ladder minimal disclosure; authorization is time-bounded and optionally time-attested; governance resists insider collusion through threshold and optional veto semantics; evidence is audit-committed and tamper-evident; and interoperability with external frameworks and settlement systems is achieved through gateways without forcing bulk disclosure. In this disclosure, “Behavioral Economic Identity (BEI)” refers to a computer-enforced identity-and-authorization framework implemented via cryptographic constraints, segmented protected storage, and auditable execution semantics, and is not limited to any particular economic model, business practice, or jurisdictional compliance scheme. SUMMARY The present disclosure relates to computer-implemented systems and methods for a privacy-controllable compliance architecture implementing a sovereign digital parcel mechanism. The disclosed embodiments address technical problems in conventional access control systems, where administrative or operational privileges frequently permit bypass of intended authorization constraints, resulting in over-exposure of sensitive data. In various embodiments, sensitive content associated with a sovereign digital parcel is partitioned into a plurality of independently encrypted segments stored such that direct storage access yields only ciphertext and/or cryptographic commitments. Access to plaintext is gated by a runtime enforcement engine that validates a cryptographically bound capability token. The capability token binds at least a purpose or basis, a strict scope (explicit segment identifiers and/or a segment-count cap), a time constraint (including reference to a time-window proof), governance evidence, and an audit reference. Decryption and high-impact operations are executed only at a lowest permitted interface, where capability token validation occurs. The system further enforces an audit-commit condition: commitment of the operation or release of decrypted data occurs only after successful generation of