US-20260128912-A1 - GLOBAL BEHAVIORAL-ECONOMICS IDENTITY (BEI) GATEWAY USING HONEYCOMB MULTI-SYSTEM DOMAIN BASEPOINTS, BROWSER-NATIVE ENFORCEMENT, VERIFIABLE RECEIPT OBJECTS (VROs), AND BEIFR2 BOUNDED ROLLBACK
Abstract
A computer-implemented identity gateway provides domain-bound consent enforcement and verifiable receipt objects (VROs) for regulated digital interactions over a multi-system basepoint network. A client-side browser-resident identity agent resolves a target domain scope into a versioned compliance profile and routing constraints, executes a consent state machine, and binds an authorization output to the domain scope, a discrete time bucket, and a nonce. The system generates a VRO per event, enabling audit trails, downstream verification, and deterministic reconciliation, including local-first operation for intermittently connected environments. When an anomaly condition is detected, a bounded rollback or callback remediation is applied under boundary rules. Example namespace identifiers (not limiting) include BEI, BEIDID, BEIEID, DRIDX, beistandard, beiterm, and BEIFR2.
Inventors
- FURONG BEI
Assignees
- FURONG BEI
Dates
- Publication Date
- 20260507
- Application Date
- 20251230
Claims (20)
- 1 . A global identity gateway system, comprising: one or more processors; and one or more non-transitory memories storing instructions that, when executed, cause the system to: receive a target domain scope identifying a domain basepoint within a multi-system honeycomb basepoint network; resolve, by a basepoint resolver, the target domain scope into a resolver output comprising at least (i) a machine-readable compliance profile identifier and a profile version, and (ii) routing adjacency constraints; enforce, by a browser-resident identity agent operating at a client runtime, a domain-bound consent state machine that cryptographically binds an authorization output to the target domain scope; generate or verify, by a time-domain component, an authorization seal derived from at least a discrete time bucket and a nonce; generate, by a receipt generator, a verifiable receipt object for at least one authorization event, the verifiable receipt object including at least the target domain scope, the discrete time bucket, and a profile version reference; and upon detecting an anomaly condition, apply, by a bounded rollback engine, a bounded rollback or callback remediation procedure subject to one or more boundary rules.
- 2 . A global identity gateway method, comprising: receiving a target domain scope identifying a domain basepoint; resolving the target domain scope into a resolver output comprising at least a compliance profile identifier, a profile version, and routing adjacency constraints; executing, at a client runtime by a browser-resident identity agent, a domain-bound consent state machine that binds an authorization output to the target domain scope; generating or verifying an authorization seal using at least a discrete time bucket and a nonce; generating a verifiable receipt object including the target domain scope, the discrete time bucket, and the profile version reference; and upon detecting an anomaly condition, applying a bounded rollback or callback remediation constrained by one or more boundary rules.
- 3 . A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause performance of operations comprising: receiving a target domain scope identifying a domain basepoint; resolving the target domain scope into a resolver output comprising at least a compliance profile identifier, a profile version, and routing adjacency constraints; enforcing, at a client runtime, a domain-bound consent state machine that cryptographically binds an authorization output to the target domain scope; generating or verifying an authorization seal derived from at least a discrete time bucket and a nonce; generating a verifiable receipt object including at least the target domain scope, the discrete time bucket, and the profile version reference; and upon detecting an anomaly condition, applying a bounded rollback or callback remediation subject to one or more boundary rules.
- 4 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the honeycomb basepoint network is represented as a graph data structure comprising basepoint nodes and adjacency edges, and wherein the routing adjacency constraints define allowed transitions between the basepoint nodes.
- 5 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the browser-resident identity agent comprises at least one of a browser extension, a browser-integrated module, or a controlled webview component configured to intercept a resource request prior to network transmission.
- 6 . The system of claim 1 , wherein binding the authorization output to the target domain scope comprises binding to at least one of a canonicalized domain hash, a certificate fingerprint, or a signed basepoint identifier.
- 7 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the discrete time bucket comprises at least one of an hour bucket, a day bucket, a week bucket, a month bucket, or a year bucket.
- 8 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the authorization seal further incorporates a context scope hash corresponding to a scenario type defined by the compliance profile.
- 9 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the verifiable receipt object further comprises at least one of an event type, a consent hash, an attestation reference, a risk score reference, a rollback policy reference, or a proof bundle comprising one or more signatures and hashes.
- 10 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the compliance profile is versioned and supports rollback to a prior version, and wherein the verifiable receipt object records the profile version reference for auditability.
- 11 . The method of claim 2 , wherein enforcing the domain-bound consent state machine comprises verifying the target domain scope against a trusted registry prior to producing the authorization output, and denying access or downgrading access upon verification failure.
- 12 . The method of claim 2 , wherein generating or verifying the authorization seal comprises generating a one-time authorization token that becomes invalid outside a predefined validity window associated with the discrete time bucket.
- 13 . The method of claim 2 , wherein generating the verifiable receipt object is enforced for at least one of cross-basepoint routing, digital signing, payment authorization, clearing authorization, settlement authorization, minting or issuance authorization, or sensitive data disclosure.
- 14 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the anomaly condition comprises at least one of a risk score exceeding a threshold, a credential revocation match, a domain-scope mismatch, or detection of suspicious automation behavior.
- 15 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the boundary rules comprise at least one of a rollback time window limit, an affected asset scope limit, a downstream propagation depth limit, or an authority threshold condition.
- 16 . The system of claim 1 , further comprising a selective disclosure component configured to disclose, under the compliance profile, a subset of credential fields satisfying a minimum-necessary rule, and to record a disclosure policy reference in the verifiable receipt object.
- 17 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the verifiable receipt object further comprises a metering metadata field or a fee signal configured to be readable by a downstream clearing system for settlement, taxation, or service-fee accounting without exposing protected user payload content.
- 18 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the browser-resident identity agent is configured for local-first verification by using cached compliance profiles and cached verification material while disconnected from a network, and is further configured to perform deterministic reconciliation and asynchronous synchronization when network connectivity is restored.
- 19 . The system of claim 1 , further comprising an IoT enforcement component configured to gate at least one device command or device data access using the authorization output and a receipt reference, wherein the device command or device data access is restricted by the target domain scope and the discrete time bucket.
- 20 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the bounded rollback or callback remediation procedure is a BEI-associated bounded rollback mechanism referred to as BEIFR2 and configured to emit a remediation receipt and audit trail upon applying the boundary rules.
Description
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 19/196,039, filed May 1, 2025, entitled “Dynamic BEI Signature BEISign System for Global Users Covering Multi-Sector Demands,” the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety to the extent not inconsistent herewith. Any claim of domestic benefit is made only as set forth in the Application Data Sheet (ADS) filed herewith. This application is also related to the Applicant's broader BEI ecosystem work involving decentralized identity resolution, domain-scope routing, verifiable evidence generation, and bounded remediation across multiple sectors. Related materials, if referenced, are provided solely as technical context and not as a claim of priority unless expressly identified as a domestic benefit or priority claim in the ADS. TECHNICAL FIELD This disclosure relates to computer and network security, browser-native authentication and authorization, decentralized identity, domain-scoped routing and policy enforcement, machine-readable compliance profiles, verifiable evidence generation using receipt objects, local-first operation for intermittently connected environments, and bounded rollback mechanisms for preventing and remediating identity theft, fraudulent authorization, and cross-domain misuse. The disclosure further relates to an industry-spanning access routing layer enabling interoperable entry into multiple sector services such as banking, customs clearance, healthcare, education, travel, communications, and Internet of Things (IoT) control. BACKGROUND Digital identity and access control remain fragmented across websites, applications, devices, and jurisdictions. Users may present different credentials (e.g., passport identifiers, driver's license identifiers, medical identifiers, education identifiers, and payment identifiers) across different relying parties, each with distinct authentication flows, policy rules, and revocation behaviors. Such fragmentation creates technical vulnerabilities and operational failures. Phishing and domain impersonation remain common because conventional login and consent prompts are often not cryptographically bound to an intended domain scope, enabling credential theft and replay across domains. Authorization events are frequently non-auditable because many systems lack standardized, machine-verifiable receipts suitable for forensic analysis and compliance audits. Further, users must repeatedly re-enroll and re-prove identity across sectors and countries, resulting in high operational cost, poor interoperability, and inconsistent security posture. Remediation is often insufficient: when fraudulent authorization is detected, existing systems frequently lack a standardized bounded remediation path that limits cascading losses and unintended downstream effects. These challenges are exacerbated in intermittently connected environments such as border checkpoints, aircraft, remote clinics, and IoT gateways where systems must operate locally and later reconcile actions deterministically. Accordingly, there exists a need for a gateway architecture in which entry is anchored on a user-controlled identity; authorization is enforced at the browser or client runtime as a non-bypassable path; consent is domain-scoped and time-scoped; actions are captured via verifiable receipt objects; and remediation can be executed via bounded rollback under explicit constraints. SUMMARY In various embodiments, a computer-implemented identity gateway is provided for regulated digital interactions over a multi-system honeycomb basepoint network. A client-side browser-resident identity agent intercepts a request for a target domain scope, resolves the request into a versioned compliance profile and routing adjacency constraints, and executes a domain-bound consent state machine that cryptographically binds an authorization output to the target domain scope. A time-domain mechanism generates or verifies an authorization seal using at least a discrete time bucket and a nonce. For each authorization event or designated high-risk event, the system generates a verifiable receipt object (VRO) including the target domain scope, the discrete time bucket, and a profile version reference, enabling auditability and downstream verification. Upon detecting an anomaly condition, a bounded rollback or callback remediation procedure is applied subject to boundary rules, including bounds on time window, affected asset scope, propagation depth, and authority conditions. In intermittently connected environments, the system supports local-first verification and deterministic reconciliation upon reconnection. In some embodiments, the system publishes and governs machine-readable profiles via one or more registries, and maintains a terminology registry, using domain identifiers only as non-limiting examples. Technical Effects The embodiments disclosed herein improve compute